Security
DRAFTThe control surface, disclosed in full.
Every privileged action in the contracts, who authorizes it and whether it waits out a timelock — including the controls that can stop a withdrawal.
At a glance
Control you can verify.
Every privileged action is disclosed — including the controls that can stop a withdrawal.
Enmonetic is a technology provider and never holds client assets. Depositors hold vault shares in their own wallets; the vault contract holds the underlying asset and deploys it only into whitelisted markets. The Partner API cannot sign transactions or create positions.
Five roles, each with a narrow job. Executor rebalances between listed providers. Curator sets fees and deposit limits. Watchdog can pause and pull funds back into the vault. Recovery resumes and re-allocates. Admin manages roles and removes empty providers. Adding a provider or changing the treasury goes through the Timelock.
Adding a provider, force-removing one that holds assets, changing the treasury or replacing the timelock is scheduled first and executes only after a public delay (minimum 30 minutes). Pending changes are published, so integrators and depositors can see them before they take effect.
Deposits and withdrawals are paused independently by the Watchdog role and resumed only by a different role, Recovery. Withdrawals can be paused — this is disclosed rather than hidden, and the app disables withdraw and explains why when it happens.
If a critical risk signal fires, any single key holding the Watchdog role can pull all assets from chosen providers without waiting for the timelock. The funds land in the vault contract itself — there is no destination parameter. They return to the markets only when the Recovery role re-allocates them.
Security reviews are published with the exact commits they cover. Each deployment shows whether its revision matches an audited one. Reviews will be listed on the Security page once completed.
01 · Control surface
Roles and controls
Actual role holders are defined by each deployment and listed under Contracts & deployments.
| Action | Authorized by | Timelock | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rebalance between listed providers Both ends must be on the provider list. | Executor | No | Rebalancer.sol (impl 0x133c…de21f) · rebalance |
| Add a provider | Timelock | Yes | Rebalancer.sol (impl 0x133c…de21f) · addProvider |
| Remove an empty provider Reverts while the provider still holds vault assets. | Admin | No | Rebalancer.sol (impl 0x133c…de21f) · removeProvider |
| Force-remove a provider that holds assets | Timelock | Yes | Rebalancer.sol (impl 0x133c…de21f) · forceRemoveProvider |
| Set entry provider | Admin | No | Rebalancer.sol (impl 0x133c…de21f) · setEntryProvider |
| Grant / revoke roles | Admin | No | RoleManager.sol · grantRole, revokeRole |
| Set management fee (max 5%) and performance fee (max 20%) Fees are minted as vault shares to the treasury. | Curator | No | Rebalancer.sol (impl 0x133c…de21f) · setManagementFee, setPerformanceFee |
| Set minimum deposit and maximum vault size | Curator | No | Rebalancer.sol (impl 0x133c…de21f) · setMinAssets, setMaxTotalAssets |
| Set treasury | Timelock | Yes | Rebalancer.sol (impl 0x133c…de21f) · setTreasury |
| Replace the timelock | Timelock | Yes | Rebalancer.sol (impl 0x133c…de21f) · setTimelock |
| Pause deposits or withdrawals (separately) Withdrawals can be paused. | Watchdog | No | Rebalancer.sol (impl 0x133c…de21f) · pause |
| Resume deposits or withdrawals | Recovery | No | Rebalancer.sol (impl 0x133c…de21f) · unpause |
| Emergency withdraw Pulls all assets from the chosen providers into the vault contract itself. | Watchdog (any single key with the role) | No | Rebalancer.sol (impl 0x133c…de21f) · emergencyWithdraw |
| Re-allocate after an emergency withdraw Only to providers on the list. | Recovery | No | Rebalancer.sol (impl 0x133c…de21f) · allocate |
- Withdrawals can be paused by the Watchdog role, and resumed only by the Recovery role.
- Deposit and withdraw pause controls are separate.
- Emergency withdraw is executed by any single key with the Watchdog role, without a timelock. This is a deliberate trade-off in favour of reaction speed.
- After an emergency withdraw, funds stay in the vault until the Recovery role re-allocates them. There is no automatic re-arm.
What the keys cannot do
Only statements confirmed against the verified contract code are listed here (Rebalancer.sol, RoleManager.sol).
- No role can send vault assets to an arbitrary address. Rebalance, emergency withdraw and re-allocation move assets only between the vault and providers on its list.
- Withdrawals and redemptions are made by the share owner or by an address the owner has approved (ERC-4626 allowance).
- Adding a provider, force-removing a provider that holds assets, changing the treasury and replacing the timelock all go through the Timelock contract (minimum delay 30 minutes).
- Admin can remove a provider only when it holds no vault assets.
- Management fee is capped at 5% and performance fee at 20% in code. Fees are paid as newly minted vault shares to the treasury; there is no withdrawal fee.
- Emergency withdraw has no destination parameter: assets can only move into the vault contract itself.
- The role that pauses (Watchdog) cannot unpause; only Recovery can resume deposits or withdrawals.
Role holders, the timelock delay and the treasury are set per deployment and listed under Contracts & deployments.
Emergency withdraw
- 1A Watchdog key calls emergency withdraw for one or more providers; all vault assets at those providers move into the vault contract.
- 2The provider is taken out of the active set — removed by Admin once empty, or force-removed through the Timelock.
- 3Normal allocation resumes only when the Recovery role re-allocates the idle assets. There is no automatic re-arm.
Three levels of reaction to risk
Level 1 · Planned rebalance
A pool's score drops below its current allocation limit — the position is reduced in the next rebalancing cycle.
Level 2 · Circuit breaker
A hard gate fails in an open position, utilization exceeds 90% or a sentinel alert fires — liquidity moves to the idle buffer and new allocations stop until conditions normalise.
Level 3 · Emergency withdraw
A critical behavioural signal — a Watchdog key pulls liquidity from providers back into the vault contract.
02 · Contracts & deployments
Contracts and deployments
No production deployment yet. Addresses, versions, role holders and timelock delays will be listed here at launch.
03 · Audits
Independent reviews
Each deployment is compared with the commits each audit covers. A review of one revision does not cover a different one.
Independent security reviews will be published here.
04 · Bug bounty
Bug bounty
Program details will be published here.
05 · Risk & resilience
Exposures and how they are handled
| Exposure | What can happen | Signal | Response |
|---|---|---|---|
| Smart contracts & adapters | A bug in the vault, rebalancer or a provider adapter leads to loss or locked funds. | Audit findings, bug bounty reports, anomalous contract state. | Pause deposits and/or withdrawals; emergency withdraw into the vault contract; fix and redeploy through the timelock. |
| Underlying markets — credit channel | Bad debt in a market lending our asset: collateral cannot be liquidated at a price that covers borrowed funds. | CRA structural and positional contours: concentration, collateral quality, HF buckets, stress scenarios, liquidation feasibility. | Hard gate sets allocation to zero; score ladder reduces limits; circuit breaker or emergency withdraw. |
| Underlying markets — liquidity channel | A run on withdrawals pushes utilization to 100%, or governance freezes reserves; assets cannot be withdrawn from the market for a period. | Utilization above 90%, frozen / paused market flag, exit-time stress versus the vault's exit SLA. | Circuit breaker to idle buffer; stop new allocations; withdrawals from that market wait for liquidity. |
| Stablecoin & network | The vault asset loses its peg, is frozen by its issuer, or the network is congested or halted. | Peg deviation, issuer actions, network status. | Pause controls; disclosure. Stablecoin issuer risk cannot be diversified inside a single-asset vault. |
| Privileged configuration | A role key is compromised or misused. | Unexpected admin transactions, scheduled timelock changes. | Provider changes wait out the timelock and are published as pending; multisig role holders; emergency withdraw destination is hard-coded. |
| Indexing & API | Indexer or API outage shows stale or missing data. | Uptime monitoring; data age. | Stale data is labelled as delayed, never shown as current. On-chain state remains the source of truth. A stale risk score blocks allocation. |
| Integration credentials | A partner's API credentials leak. | Unusual API activity. | Credential rotation. The Partner API cannot sign customer transactions or create on-chain positions. |
| Customer actions | Wrong network, unlimited approvals, phishing front-ends. | — | Exact-amount approvals by default; confirmation screen shows chain, token, receiver, amounts in asset and shares, and fees; contract addresses only from the published deployments list. |
Exit behavior
- Redeeming burns shares and returns the asset from the vault's idle balance and, if needed, from underlying markets.
- Execution depends on underlying market liquidity, contract state (including pause) and network conditions. No exit time is promised.
- maxWithdraw and maxRedeem report what can be exited at a given moment.
06 · Incident disclosure
Incident disclosure policy
Security incidents affecting user funds or contract state are disclosed on this page and in the risk events feed, with a timeline, affected vaults and actions taken. Report vulnerabilities to the security contact below.